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RES JUDICATA
RES JUDICATA-The Effect of The Oklahoma
Supreme Court Scandal
In the 1954 decision of Johnson v. Johnsonl, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed a lower court holding disallowing
the admissibility of a will to probate. In a per curiam decision
adopted by Justices Johnson, Welch, Arnold and Blackbird,
with Justice Corn concurring, the court ordered the will ad-
mitted to probate and the estate of the decedent distributed.
Approximately four years later, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma announced another seemingly routine decision in
Oklahoma Company v. O'Neil.2 This case involved an alleged
fraudulent contract for the purchase of an oil and gas lease-
hold working interest. Again the lower court was reversed by
a split decision with Justices Johnson, Welch, Corn, Davison
and Carlile adopting the per curiam opinion.
Both of these cases lay dormant for a number of years
until reports of the alleged taking of bribes and other mis-
conduct on the part of several Oklahoma Supreme Court
justices became public in early 1964. Of those involved, former
Justice Corn is the only one pertinent to this note. In 1964,
he was convicted on federal criminal charges for filing false
income tax returns. While serving his sentence, he made state-
ments under oath to federal authorities in which he admitted
taking bribes continuously from 1938 to 1959 from an Okla-
homa City attorney in return for his vote in deciding certain
cases appealed to the high court. Former Justice Corn also
implicated two other justices, Johnson and Welch, who voted
with the majority in the Johnson and O'Neil cases.3 The
ensuing Oklahoma Supreme Court scandal resulted in attempts
by defeated litigants to reopen cases decided during the period
1 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).
2 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958).
3 For a brief review of these events see 36 OEIA. B.J. 601,
704 (1965).
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when one or more Oklahoma Supreme Court justices were
allegedly taking bribes.
Article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution requires that
"Eal majority of the members of the Supreme Court shall
constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of the majority of
the said court shall be necessary to decide any question.4 The
Bill of Rights of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "The
courts of justice of this State shall be open to every person,
and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and
every injury ... and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, delay or prejudice."5 The relevant statute
regarding the receiving of bribes by public officials provides
that every judicial officer who does so "shall forfeit his office,
be forever disqualified to hold any public office ... and be
punished by imprisonment .. . or by fine ... and imprison-
ment .... 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court based its decision on the
petitions to reopen the Johnson7 and O'Neil8 cases on this
foundation of statutory and constitutional law. In the second
Johnson case, petitioners sought to have the mandate with-
drawn and the decision vacated in the original Johnson case.
The petition was based solely on participation of former
Justice Corn in that case; it was stipulated that there was
no actual bribery involved in the original case. The issue
presented was whether the fact that former Justice Corn
was admittedly accepting bribes in return for his vote worked
an automatic forfeiture of his office and/or rendered him
ineligible to participate in the decision brought under review.
4 OHLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (emphasis added).
5 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (emphasis added).
6 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 382 (1961) (emphasis added).
7 424 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967) (petition to relitigate Johnson v.
Johnson will hereafter be referred to as the second Johnson
case).
8 431 P.2d 445 (Okla. 1967) (petition to relitigate Oklahoma
Company v. O'Neil will hereafter be referred to as the
second O'Neil case).
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If this question were answered in the affirmative, the original
case would not have been decided by a "majority of the court"
as required by the Oklahoma Constitution.
The court first considered the statutory provision re-
garding forfeiture of office. It held that the statute "requires
at least a formal adjudication of guilt in a proceeding where
due process is afforded, and may even require conviction
in a criminal proceeding. Since no proceeding of either
character was had, there was no forfeiture of office . . .
under the statute."9 The court based this construction of
the statute on the need for due process to adequately protect
the accused official's interests. However, it is not illogical
to reach the interpretation petitioners argued. It is possible
the legislature intended for the forfeiture of office and dis-
qualification provisions of the statute to come into effect
automatically without a "formal adjudication of guilt" and
the punishment clause to become applicable only upon con-
viction.
The court next considered the allegation that assuming
Justice Corn was not automatically disqualified to hold office
under the statute, his corrupt activity at the time disqualified
him from participating in the decision. The court looked to
the provision in Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution which
requires that "justice be administered without sale." The
court construed this clause to mean that a violation occurred
only where it is shown that there was actual "sale, denial or
prejudice" involved in the specific case. "If a decision is
rendered in a particular case without sale . . . then, even
though the decision be participated in by a judge who has
been corrupt in other cases, we think, the requirements of
the provision have been met."o Further, the court opened
the door for the second O'Neil case, by implying that it would
9 424 P.2d at 419.
1o Id. at 420.
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vacate judgments in "those cases where there is at least some
evidence that wrong-doing influenced the decision."]]
The foregoing conclusions of the court were strongly at-
tacked in a special concurring opinion by Special Justice
Merrill. He argued that former Justice Corn became dis-
qualified to sit on the bench from the beginning of his unlaw-
ful acts. Special Justice Merrill pointed out that decisions
reached by a judge disqualified by reason of bias, relationship
to the parties or counsel, or interest in the litigation have been
ruled void in Oklahoma and in other jurisdictions.12 His
argument was that "these disqualifying factors were insig-
nificant compared with the enormity revealed by the record
before us."13 He would have reopened the original case if the
petitioners had alleged that at the first trial they did not
know of the corrupt agreement between former Justice Corn
and the Oklahoma City attorney, and that they had no reason
to inquire into it as required by statute.14
It has long been recognized that no judge should preside
over litigation where he is not completely independent, dis-
interested and impartial.15 Several Oklahoma decisions have
applied the rule that parties to lawsuits are entitled to a
determination by an impartial court, free from bias, prejudice
and interest.16 In State ex. rel. Garret v. Freeman,17 the Okla-
homa Supreme Court stated: "We conceive it to be the duty
of this court to hold the scales level, and to see to it, insofar
11 Id.
12 Id. at 421-23. See cases cited notes 23-25 infra.
13 424 P.2d at 423.
14 OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 13 (1961).
15 Norton v. Inhabitants of Fayette, 134 Me. 468, 188 A. 281
(1936); State v. Muraski, 6 N.J. Super. 36, 69 A.2d 745
(Super. Ct. 1949).
16 State ex. Tel. Larecy v. Sullivan, 207 Okla. 128, 248 P.2d
239 (1952); State ex. rel. Wade v. Crawford, 178 Okla. 230,
62 P.2d 620 (1936); Coker v Crump, 124 Okla. 150, 288 P.
321 (1930); State ex. rel. Lowry v. Walden, 142 Okla. 115,
285 P. 951 (1930); London v. Ogden, 130 Okla. 89, 265 P.
139 (1928); State ex. rel. Garrett v. Freeman, 102 Okla.
291, 229 P. 296 (1924); Son v. Linebaugh, 101 Okla. 291,
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as we can, that impartial justice is meted out by an unbiased
judge . . . ."18 The court also stated that "[t]his court shall
see to it that no suspicion attach to the course of judicial
proceeding, in order that it may be made apparent... to the
community that the judicial proceedings are impartial and
beyond reproach; this to the end that the confidence in our
judicial system may be sustained."19 In a later case in which
the trial judge's son was the plaintiff's attorney, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court on review stated that wherever the
existence of substantial grounds for the disqualification of a
judge is shown, he should not try the case. If he should at-
tempt to do so, the high court may order him to disqualify
himself.20 Also, by statute2l in Oklahoma, "En]o judge ...
shall sit in any cause. . .Y in which he is interested,22 where
he is related to any party,23 where he has been counsel for
225 P. 686 (1924); State ex. rel. Vahlberg v. Chismore, 90
Okla. Crim. 244, 213 P.2d 293 (1949).
17 102 Okla. 291, 229 P. 296 (1924). The court ordered issuance
of a writ of mandamus requiring the presiding judge in a
pending election contest suit to certify his own disqualifica-
tion due to his sympathy with the Ku Klux Klan and his
financial relationships with defendant's attorneys. See
Garrett v. London, 107 Okla. 72, 229 P. 1079 (1929), for
the decision in this case when tried on its merits under
a new trial judge.
18 102 Okla. at 294, 229 P. at 298.
19 Id. at 293, 229 P. at 297-98.
20 State ex. rel. Bennett v. Childers, 188 Okla. 14, 105 P.2d 762
(1940).
21 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 571 (1961).
22 See State ex. rel. Richardson v. Keen, 185 Okla. 539, 95 P.2d
120 (1939); Cimarron Util. Co. v. City of Guymon, 171 Okla.
344, 43 P.2d 143 (1935); Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25
P.2d 666 (1933); Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 282, 29 P.2d
605 (1933); State ex. rel. Dabney v. Ledbetter, 156 Okla. 23,
9 P.2d 728 (1932); State ex. rel. Short v. Owens, 125 Okla.
66, 256 P. 704 (1927); Lawton Rapid Transit Ry. Co. v. City
of Lawton, 31 Okla. 458, 122 P. 212 (1912).
23 See State v. Pitchford, 43 Okla. 105, 141 P. 433 (1927);
State ex. rel. Short v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 P. 704 (1927);
Hengst v. Burnett, 40 Okla. 142, 135 P. 1062 (1913).
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either side or where any proceeding in which he has acted
as attorney is questioned.24 The statute expressly includes
all common law grounds for disqualification such as bias and
prejudice, relationship with counsel of either party, and state-
ments and expressions of opinion by the judge. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals have disqualified trial judges and ordered new trials
on the common law grounds as well as on the statutory
grounds.25
The court's decision in the second Johnson case was based
on a more far-reaching concept. This concept has been forci-
bly set forth by the eminent New York trial lawyer Mr. Louis
Nizer in his book, The Jury Returns.26 Nizer discussed a
divorce action where the grossly wrongdoing husband ob-
tained a divorce from his wife in a court presided over by a
judge who had received gifts from the husband's attorney.
The judge had been disciplined by the bar association, recom-
mended for impeachment by a grand jury, and in fact, nar-
24 See Harjo v. Chilcoat, 146 Okla. 62, 294 P. 119 (1930);
Hamilton v. Pendleton, 111 Okla. 55, 237 P. 611 (1925);
First Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co., 95 Okla.
259, 219 P. 690 (1923); Powers v. Cook, 48 Okla. 43, 149
P. 1121 (1915); Dowell v. Hall, 85 Okla. Crim. 92, 185 P.2d
232 (1947); Sawyer v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 186, 119 P.2d
256 (1941); Goad v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. 411, 279 P. 927
(1929).
25 Bias and prejudice: Stokes v. State, 366 P.2d 425 (Okla.
1961); State ex. rel. Harden v. Edwards, 176 Okla. 187, 56
P.2d 402 (1936); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 145 Okla. 293, 242 P. 833 (1930); State ex. rel. Short
v. Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 256 P. 681 (1927); Relationship to
Counsel: Morissette v. Musgrave, 188 Okla. 222, 108 P.2d
123 (1940); State ex. rel. Mayo v. Pitchford, 43 Okla. 105,
141 P. 433 (1914); Expressions of Opinion: State ex. rel.
Reeves v. Bellah, 311 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1957); Hearn v.
Miller, 168 Okla. 411, 33 P.2d 506 (1934); O'Brien v. Clark,
5 Okla. Crim. 122, 113 P. 543 (1911); Crawford v. Ferguson,
5 Okla. Crim. 377, 115 P. 278 (1911).
26 L. NizmR, THE Jcmy RETuRNs (1966).
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rowly escaped impeachment by the state legislature. All
appeals by the wife based on the constitutional safeguards
of a fair and impartial trial, equal protection of the law, and
due process failed.27 Why it failed was explained by Nizer
as follows:
The answer lies in the philosophical principle that the
law's objective is to achieve stability in the social order.
It will even sacrifice an individual, if to protect him
means to create general chaos. If every decision ever
rendered by a judge whose integrity comes under sus-
picion were subject to review, the settled rights of
hundreds of citizens would be cast in doubt. The con-
fusion and injury would be limitless. Litigants who had
relied on the court's decisions and disposed of property,
or spent the judgments collected, or remarried and raised
new families, would be subject to new trials in retro-
spect. The injustice from such a belated effort to correct
a possible wrong might far exceed the injustice done to
an aggrieved victim.
Furthermore, there are practical considerations re-
quiring the same conclusion. Years may have passed
since the possible corrupt decision. Evidence may have
disappeared. Witnesses may have died. The revival of
contests may constitute a new injustice to litigants, who
must cope with stale issues which they had a right to
think were determined forever.
Besides, who can be certain that even a corrupt judge
was always corrupt? It is an unwarranted assumption
that every decision he handed down was tainted. Yet
if one case is opened, is not the door ajar for re-examina-
tion for all his cases?
If one balances the grievance of justice denied to a
few individuals against the chaotic uncertainty and in-
stability of a general reopening of all contests previously
put to rest, the rule that finality of decision for all is
more important than rectifying the possible grievances
of a few, can be understood. Above all is the salient fact
that judicial venality is uniquely rare, far rarer than
absconding bank officials, corrupt public officials, or de-
27 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIV.
19681
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ceiving business executives.... In a society where
imperfection due to human failing must be reckoned
with, the individual citizen must occasionally be sacri-
ficed in the interest of the public good.28
This concept of the law was recognized by the court in
the second Johnson case.29 However, as was pointed out in
the concurring opinion, of the one thousand cases decided
from 1938 to 1959 which were split decisions in which Justice
Corn was with the majority, many of these cases represented
compliance with the custom of allowing a judgment to be
rendered by the concurring vote of any five justices without
express participation by the other four. In other words,
some of the decisions which appear to have been decided by
a majority of only five may actually have been six to three,
seven to two, eight to one or even unanimous decisions.
Therefore, the argument against a general review of hun-
dreds of settled decisions is substantially weakened since
there would not be nearly as many cases which would be
reviewable as the record might indicate. The apparent dif-
ficulty with this reasoning is, of course, the problem of
determining which of the one thousand cases fit into this
category. The concurring opinion also expressed an inter-
esting policy argument in rebuttal to the philosophical reason-
ing against relitigation of previously settled cases. The rule
prohibiting reopening of cases where no actual wrongdoing
is shown may actually encourage judges to enter into cor-
rupt agreements. "In the interest of justice, of integrity, of
public confidence in the due administration of justice, it
should be the law that no man so deaf to the obligations
of a judge as to put his vote at the command of another
should be permitted to effectuate judgments outlasting the
revelation of his infamy."30
The decision in the second Johnson case was followed by
28 NIzEa, supra note 26, at 419.
29 424 P.2d at 418.
30 Id. at 423.
[Vol. 5, No. 1
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the courts' ruling in the second O'Neil case. In that case,
former Justice Corn testified before a court appointed referee
that he had received a bribe for his vote in reversing the
lower court in the original O'Neil case. The court, relying on
the same statutory and constitutional provisions it had in
the second Johnson case, unanimously granted the bill of
review, recalled the mandate issued in the O'Neil case, and
vacated that decision. The court further ordered that it
would hear the case on its merits. The only difficulty en-
countered by the court was the statutory provision concern-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence.1 The court held that
the uncorroborated testimony of former Justice Corn concern-
ing the bribe in the original O'Neil case, although controverted
by evidence of respondents, was sufficient to hold that former
Justice Corn's vote in that case was null and void; therefore,
the case was not decided by a "majority of the court" under
the Oklahoma Constitution.
As a result of these recent decisions, it would appear
that certain cases decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
between 1938 and 1959 may be subject to review. Where
it can be shown that former Justice Corn or any other justice
participated and voted with the majority under the influence
of a bribe in a five to four decision, the case will be re-
viewed on its merits in a trial de novo before the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. Under the rule of the second O'Neil case,
the uncorroborated testimony of the bribed justice may be
sufficient evidence to establish the taking of the bribe.
In analyzing these cases, one may argue that the Okla-
homa Supreme Court is applying different rules at different
levels of litigation in cases involving disqualification of judges.
At the trial level, the high court has not been hesitant to
31 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 381 (1961): "No person shall be dis-
qualified as a witness in any civil action or proceeding, by
reason of his interest ... or by reason of his conviction of
a crime; but such interest or conviction may be shown for
the purpose of affecting his credibility."
19681
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order disqualification of a trial judge or to render a trial
court's decision void wherp the judge, by reason of statutory
or common law disability, was not qualified to sit. This has
been true even though no actual wrongful motive or actions
on his part were alleged or proved.32 On the other hand, at
the appellate level, where the wrongdoing justice sits on the
bench of the highest court of the state, that court will not
render its own prior decisions null and void merely because
that justice participated in the decision. Instead, the court has
required that it be shown that he actually acted wrongfully
in the specific case under review. By avoiding important
constitutional and statutory obstacles through adroit statutory
construction, the court was able to reach this result. There
is no constitutional or statutory provision precisely in point
which would render high court decisions void. It may be
that the policy argument as presented by Nizer against re-
opening all such cases was the real foundation of the court's
decision in the second Johnson case. This is not necessarily
invalid reasoning. It is a very forceful argument - but
again the double standard appears. Certainly, but for the
policy argument against reopening such cases, Justice Corn in
the second Johnson case could have been declared disqualified
to sit for the statutory reason of interest or at least for the
common law reasons of bias and prejudice. If he had been
disqualified, the original Johnson case and all those in a similar
situation would be subject to relitigation.
In support of the practical argument against reopening
cases such as those under consideration is the legal argument
of res judicata; that is, a final judgment on merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights of partiei
in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit.33 It should be noted, however, that in cases
such as the O'Neil case where actual wrongdoing by a state
32 See notes 22-25 supra.
33 For a discussion of the doctrine of res judicata see Harness
v. Myers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 P. 285 (1930).
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supreme court justice was shown, the original parties did not
have their "day in court", at least at the appellate stage,
due to the unlawful acts of a member of the court. It follows
that the doctrine of res judicata would not apply since these
cases were not in a strict sense "determined on their merits"
as required by the doctrine. Hence, if this argument is adopted,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has been consistent in refusing
to reopen the Johnson case and in ordering a new trial in
the O'Neil case.
There are numerous reported cases involving various
forms of misconduct on the part of trial judges. In such
instances, the aggrieved individual is protected by his right
to appeal to an untainted court of review. The problem of
res judicata is, therefore, not presented. This is not so, how-
ever, where the highest appellate court was itself contaminated
by one or more dishonest members. In that situation, the
same court must, after it has been purged of its infection,
deal with the question of whether prior cases decided during
the period when it was contaminated with the cancer of cor-
ruption should be relitigated. It is then that all the problems
of res judicata come to bear. It appears, in Oklahoma at
least, the courts believe that public policy favoring a stable
judicial system outweighs the private interest in protection
of individual rights. Therefore, prior litigation will not be
reopened unless actual corruption in a specific case is shown.
It is indeed fortunate that the situation rarely arises where
an appellate court, instead of looking toward the future,
must consider and disturb the settled past.
W. Jay Jones
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